Unwilling or Unable to Reform?: OPDO’s Timid Moves and the Impatience of the Mass
1.Introduction
OPDO’s Team Lemma is a child of the Oromo Protests. Most supporters of the protests sympathize with the team’s efforts and its anguish at not getting a quick traction. Although OPDO has conveniently appropriated Qeerroo’s language of resistance and has positioned itself as the protest’s voice in government, so far it has not effectively transformed itself (from a junior partner that is increasingly asserting itself in the EPRDF coalition) to a governing party with equal, if not bigger, stake in the (co-)Governance of the country. Even worse, it has yet to distance itself from the dominant TPLF core in the coalition. Consequently, to the extent that it finds it difficult to explicitly denounce TPLF’s crimes and distances itself at this critical stage, it still remains complicit in the atrocious crimes of a TPLF-EPRDF establishment that is unwilling and unable to reform. Former Communications Minister Getachew Reda’s rejection of ‘reform’ as “too strong a word” to characterize the on-going itchy political dynamics is already an emphatic indication of the unwillingness even to contemplate reform in TPLF circles. OPDO’s explicit insistence on reform in the latest Resolution of its Central Committee meeting—and the quest for “a new Ethiopia” thereof—while still refraining from taking the Parliamentary and other formal institutional platforms for implementing substantial reform, is an indication of the system’s structural incapacity for reform. In this piece, I make a close reading of the Resolution and reflect on where we are headed and what may need to be done under the circumstances.
2. The Resolution I: What OPDO is saying
From a close reading of the Resolution, we gather that the Central committee met for ten days for the objective of finding ways to enhance and implement EPRDF’s latest resolve and commitment to ‘deep renewal’ in such a way that they will ensure the peace and “togetherness” of the peoples, to preserve the survival of their country, and to expedite the change the country is going into. At the very outset, the meeting stressed the imperative of listening to the peoples’ grievances, apologizing for the government’s failings, and taking corrective measures. It identified four challenges that needed their attention, namely: a) challenges posed by new threats to the Federal system; b) the challenge of ensuring equitable distribution of wealth; c) the challenge of operationalizing a participatory democracy; and d) the challenge of securing peace and justice for their people. These are identified as the basic needs of the time. Corruption, maladministration, abuse of power, illicit private acquisition of land in the name of investment, eviction of hundreds of thousands, restriction of freedom of movement, accountability of criminals, failure to implement the rule of law, etc are listed as causing threat to the federal system. Conflicts, causing damage to life and property and disrupting peace and security, are presented as threats to the country’s very survival. Corruption, engaging in contraband trade, illicit movement of money, and operating in a web of connections at the highest level set up for facilitating illicit economic gains are identified as the causes of illicit wealth creation and unjust wealth distribution.
As solutions, the Resolution identifies the following: fighting corruption, eliminating destabilisers of free and equitable market, setting up a modern, efficient, and just administrative system, implementing constitutional provisions unabridged, respecting human rights, ensuring mobility of labor, ensuring inter-regional solidarity and reinforcing the emerging people-to-people diplomacy, and empowering ordinary people for development (through ideas that ensure waste-free utilization of wealth, transparency, accountability, etc). It summarizes the solutions under three major rubrics, namely “Comprehensive Administrative (or service) Reform,” “Comprehensive Justice Reform (including the police system),”and “Promoting peace and solidarity among peoples” (through Oromummaa-based values of affirming one another, collaboration, togetherness, tolerance, and Gadaa-based methods and values of resolving differences in an expansive and expanding public space of discussion and debate).
In a gesture that seems to acknowledge the predominantly youth-driven Oromo protest, it underscores the need for managing the anger and addressing the concerns of the youth in a non-violent manner. It insists on the necessity of cherishing a democratic culture within the context of which many young people are prepared to inherit the better country the party is working hard to leave behind to posterity. In particular, it promises to address specific demands of the youth such as those relating to youth unemployment, resettling the displaced, implementing good governance, modernizing service provisions, restructuring the justice system (the courts, the prosecution, and the police), and making Afaan Oromoo one of the working languages of the Federal Government. The resolution then proceeds to make specific calls to the Oromo general public, the Oromo Youth (recognizing Qeerroo), Oromo intellectuals, Oromo Civil Servants, Oromia Security Forces, its own members, the Oromo Diaspora, other member parties of the EPRDF Coalition, Opposition Political Parties, and the entirety of the Ethiopian Peoples (referred to as “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples”).
In its call to the Oromo people, it invokes the sacrifice they paid as a people of resistance “to create the new Ethiopia”. It seems to imply that the Oromo are a people in a perpetual quest for equality, justice, democracy, and peace. It suggestively alludes to the inclusive system of Gadaa which affirms, nurtures, and embraces difference. Without saying it in explicit terms, it seems to point to the Oromo as a people of redemption that need to step up to ensure the survival of the country. In its call to the Qeerroo, it insists on the need to cherish incremental changes, unveiling their discomfort with Qeerro’s impatience with OPDO’s timid exercise of fudging with small policies on the margins. The Regional Security is called upon to fight “contrabandists” and “rent seekers” by enforcing the rule of law. From its own members, it demanded competence, sacrifice, and strength of will. From the Oromo diaspora, it sought cooperation. From the EPRDF, it sought: a) a principled relationship among member parties and their individual members; and b) the implementation of the Executive Committee’s November 2017 Resolution. Emphasizing the well-worn cliché that “democracy is a question of survival for Ethiopia,” it called on the opposition political parties to closely collaborate with them and work together for a common national goal.
The above is more or less what the resolution says. What are the things that are left unsaid? And what do they mean?
3. The Resolution II: What OPDO left Unsaid (or just Implied)
One of the things repeatedly mentioned is the creation and building of the “new Ethiopia”. However, it hardly says anything about what constitutes the ‘new’ aspect of this new Ethiopia (except for the vague allusion to a country in which there will be tolerance and respect for one another’s rights equally). Ensuring the survival of the country is another recurrent theme in the Resolution. But where the threat is coming from (whether it is from outside or inside the country) and how to fend off the threat to survival is hardly explicitly mentioned. It also talks about “individuals who, in order to secure their own individual and group interests, have killed innocent citizens and committed dastardly crimes,” but it does not clearly say who those persons or groups are. It pledges to take measures on such people (you can’t help not thinking about Abdi (Iley) and General Abrha (Quarter)) to enforce the rule of law thereby ensuring responsibility and accountability. But there is no hint as to who these are (even broadly), nor is there any indication of how and by when. In relation to the Somali region, OPDO seems to show a moral fortitude by magnanimously offering peaceful modes of resolving differences with a sense of responsibility making sure that “no feeling of being a stranger is created.” This seems to be a discrete way of stating that we ought to be careful not to alienate them (further) thereby making them want to secede. (This seems to be OPDO’s way of speaking back to TPLF’s scare-mongering mantra of “Somali region is going to invoke the secession clause of the constitution” often used to scare the OPDO into submission to all the demands of Abdi Iley.) Positively interpreted, this is a very interesting gesture, albeit an incipient one, at doing one’s best to make unity attractive to whosoever wants to secede. But one wonders if this wasn’t supposed to be done through the national governmental institutions rather than an embattled political party such as the OPDO.
What the Resolution does not explicitly say but hints at indirectly when it asserts the pledge to make Afaan Oromoo a working language at the Federal level are some of the questions right at the center of the#Oromoprotests, namely:
- a. The question of Finfinnee/Addis Ababa;
- b. The question of releasing political prisoners;
- c. The question of reconfiguring the membership in the Executive Committee of EPRDF;
- d. The question of whether the OPDO, as the largest member party of the EPRDF coalition, can take the leadership thereby making their leader the Prime Minister.
These questions are hinted at (but not explicitly stated) in the clause which says, “pending the as yet incomplete responses to the demands of the people,” which it says are being handled “with strict discipline”.
4. What needs to be Done: Modest Steps towards Reform
From the above, one can see that the OPDO is seeking reform. But because the TPLF is unwilling to reform, the OPDO is routinely dodging the key political questions of the time and is, instead, tinkering with minor issues on the margins. As a result, OPDO seems to be unable to pursue the reform it claims it wants. It thus continues to advise the youth to cherish their piecemeal achievements of their protest. It exhorts the public not to continue to resist. Owing to this inability, OPDO’s efforts are increasingly being reduced to ‘mere talk’. In aligning their talk with the popular discourse of resistance, they have long started to sound like activists in government. As the way in which they handled hot political issues suggests (e.g., their reticence to act decisively to release the prisoners and their reluctance to take leadership on the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa issue), they are becoming a timid, small “opposition party within the government.” A very weak and small minority party at that, belying the fact that they are the largest party in the coalition, also commanding the largest number of seats in the Federal Parliament (178 out of 547).
If OPDO is to pursue reform in earnest, it has to begin to act like a government that has pre-eminence both in Oromia and in the wider country. It is time that they use their parliamentary power and their power in the Executive to table all the key political questions in formal institutions (such as the parliament) and act from those formal governmental platforms. No amount of party meetings, “evaluations (aka gimgema),” and resolutions can make up for utilizing institutional power as a government. It is the only legal, constitutional, and legitimate method of acting as a party in government. They need to realize that they stop being activists and start governing. In order to govern properly—and to address the key political questions comprehensively—they need to heed the popular demands: at least in Oromia and Amhara regions, where people have clearly demonstrated that they want substantive change, and have rejected TPLF’s domination of the national political, economic, and security spheres and the use of OPDO and ANDM as proxies in their regions. Their rejection of TPLF is also a rejection of the old OPDO and ANDM establishment. The people’s wait-and-see attitude vis-à-vis OPDO and ANDM is an attempt to give the latter a chance to change the establishment from within. Reform (genuine, substantive reform that is consumable in real time) is therefore the new lifeline extended to OPDO and ANDM in their respective regions. If they utilize this life line extended to them by their people, then they too can give TPLF a chance to reform before it is too late. If the reform succeeds, then the gradual, if painstaking, work of transformation can begin in earnest. However, if they fail to utilize this lifeline, they may as well be rebuffed in no time. It becomes evident then, if not already, that, short of regime change, there can be no hope of addressing the popular demands.
The unwillingness (of TPLF) and inability (of OPDO and ANDM) to bring about reform will prolong the political stalemate. The regime will remain stuck in its quagmire. The only way to unstuck themselves is by taking some measures that are too obvious for anyone to miss. In particular, they (OPDO and ANDM, together or each on their own) should start utilizing formal constitutional institutions and parliamentary platforms to pursue their reform agenda. By using the formal institutions, among other things, they ought to:
- a. resolve to release all political prisoners unconditionally;
- b. take measures to resettle the displaced people and extend relief aid immediately;
- c. order the military and all federal security forces to go back to their barracks and limit their work to that which is constitutionally circumscribed for them;
- d. bring the Liyyu Police aggression to an immediate halt and make the perpetrators of violence politically, administratively, and legally accountable;
- e. launch a parliamentary scrutiny to all military and security misadventures of the last several years and make sure criminals are brought to trials;
- f. launch a comprehensive security sector reform as promised several times and as required by the constitution (art 87);
- g. take decisive measures to stop all activities of land grabbing;
- h. take measures on illicit investment practices (e.g., on mining and extraction industries; the bank procedures for loans with collaterals; etc) and expropriate illegally obtained wealth;
- i. repeal all repressive laws (e.g., anti-terrorism law, charities and societies law, media law, laws on political party registration and licensing, laws on freedom of assembly, etc), including the newly proposed urban planning laws and policies and strategies to create special economic zones which are causing massive evictions and suffering; and
- j. relax the parliamentary rules of procedure in accordance with the constitutional provisions;
In its own realm, the OPDO ought to act swiftly in its Caffee Oromiyaa to issue a law and/or a plan of action on how to enforce Oromia’s interest on Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. Accordingly, they ought to issue a resolution in the State Parliament (i.e., Caffee Oromiyaa) to reject and repudiate the federal draft law on the constitutional special interest of Oromia. If the Federal Government proceeds with its plan, they should organize themselves to contest its constitutionality using all available political and legal armours at their disposal. Likewise, they should issue their own urban planning law in order to pre-empt the application in Oromia of the proposed federal urban planning law, a law that has devastating consequences for the Oromo people consequences reminiscent of the ones associated with the so-called “Addis Ababa Master Plan” of 2014. In addition, it should also act to release all political prisoners and close all torture chambers within its jurisdiction.
5. Conclusion
Transformative change is on the mind of the people. In contrast, reform is on the mind of OPDO. Its recent resolution betrays a longing for the new (new Ethiopia, new and better country, new ideas, new solidarity, etc). In a stark contrast to both, it is “deep renewal” (or “a leadership shake up”) that is on the mind of TPLF. While TPLF is unwilling to reform because any change that may come about even through reform is not to its advantage, OPDO and ANDM are unable to reform because they are reluctant (or perhaps too timid) to utilize the formal institutional platforms in order to perform their popular mandate and steer the country to a more wholesome transformation. Owing to unwillingness or/and inability, the OPDO still continues to be a long way away from effecting a change in favour of liberty and equality. Will they continue to be “the activists in government,” an “opposition party from within,” or will they size up to the power they wield and the challenge they face to reform (and transform) the country? Will theirs be another squandered opportunity (going to be part of Merera Gudina’s long list of missed opportunities in Ethiopia’s modern political history) or will it chart out a different—and better--trajectory? Time will tell. In the meantime, the people are suffering. And the Qeerroo are running out of patience.
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